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DISPATCH NO. MGK-A-24379

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division M

DATE: 22 November 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— KIBITZ and VULTURE Progress Report

~~Secret~~

Changed to

BY AD HOPKINS

DATE

DATE

REF: MGKW-6673

KIBITZ Program

1. Submitted herewith is a review of the progress of the KIBITZ Project to date. In this effort to recruit and organize stay-behind agents for the event of hostilities which could cause the European Defense Forces to be pushed back or even out of Europe, we have included the responsibility of getting training to such agents, as well as caching equipment, weapons, and money for their use, but have been able to pay little attention to the development and training of non-commo or accessory personnel to provide intelligence to or support the commo agent.

a. It will be seen that our concentration has been on the development of commo personnel, based on the premise that the establishment of the communications echelon is most essential as an assurance of a communications link through which we could, if necessary, develop other agent activity. Also, experience with the shortage of training personnel has shown the development of commo agents to be our most obvious and critical problem. In fact we have had to re-evaluate our communications candidates and for the time being have about given up further stress on the training of agents from scratch. Except for KIBITZs 6 and 7 who, as University students have rather long vacations which they can spend at MISSOURI, and 2 who owns his own business which he is able to leave for a few weeks at a time during the slack season, we find it almost out of the question to get fully employed or otherwise occupied candidates away (with security cover) to MISSOURI for the several months necessary for training. Even with our present new view of men with previous commo experience who could be brought up to our standards during weekends, we are constantly being frustrated by the inaccessibility of the new MISSOURI location in the MOB training area. This creates a travel problem to even our #9 who of all commo candidates lives nearest to MISSOURI and still must spend eight hours of his time from Saturday noon to Sunday evening in the round trip travel. The several months of training for beginners spread out over such weekends is out of the question. As an alternate we have tried in the KIBITZ 3 training project using an instructograph for self study of the basic elementals, such as code, but it is almost impossible to conceal the hundreds of such hours of code practice from other members of a household and the man (see KIBITZ 3) becomes known for his interest in radio.

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
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
Solution, of course, would be in a mobilized training program in which the instructors could set up shop in apartments in each of the necessary large cities of Germany where instruction would be practicable in the few hours free time the student could manage away from friends and family. However, Commo is not so endowed with personnel who could be deployed throughout Germany. In the face of this we are attempting to train these part-timers by grooming [] with a little commo experience so that he might be able to provide the experience of temporary training services in hotels convenient to the trainee, where equipment can be provided for them to work by themselves for the few hours they can sneak away from their families. However, [] is really as essentially occupied in searching out burial spots and burying new VULTURE units, replacing old, and adding weapons and emergency funds to other burials. Thus, we cannot look to him for a complete solution to our training problem. It must be hoped that we or Commo will soon see better days with more personnel to devote to training KIBITZ personnel.

b. The phase of developing our non-commo agent personnel strategically placed with special training to cover specific targets has of necessity remained incidental to the general initiative. Though we are thus gradually accumulating men of reasonable agent (as 4, 6x, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16) or accessory (1, 2, 8, 9, 10a, 11a, 14), and cover potential (12, 17, and MKA-23034) within our own immediate coverage plus the KIBITZ 15 effort, which indicates prospect of some eight or ten more men capable of at least intelligent OB reporting, we have as yet no formulated plans and feel we must wait for Washington guidance in such strategic matters. In this regard we are asking whether Washington would wish to provide us with training material or guides as well as instructions in ciphering which we could now be studying for means of presentation to the agent.

c. Accompanying this report is a map (A) illustrating the deployment of the KIBITZ agents through Germany. The numbers are designations of KIBITZ personnel; numbers 6x, 8x, and 16x represent recruits who are not yet qualified for this report. For ease and clarity we have employed the two colors, red and blue, to distinguish between commo and non-commo personnel. Thus it is seen that of the twenty-three KIBITZ agent personnel, eleven (3, 5, 6, 7, 8x, 9a, 10, 13, 14, 16x, 17) are slated as commo agents and twelve (1, 2, 4, 6x, 8, 9, 10a, 11, 11a, 12, 15, 16) are cast for non-agent or accessory roles. Of the eleven commo agents, two (6 and 10) are trained, and three (3, 9a, and 13) are taking training now. Of the remaining six, 5, 8x, 14, 16x and 17 have had communications backgrounds and could be trained in a very short time, training facilities permitting. KIBITZ 7 has had no commo experience and will require several months training. As a further breakdown, one sees 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14, and 17 as lone elements or single agents, and six teams of 2-4, 6-6x, 8-8x, 9-9a, 10-10a, 11-11a, 15 - see para 15, and 16-16x.

The following commentaries on the above agents are each written separately for ease in filing in their individual dossiers.

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Legend: Red indicates COMMO Personnel
 Blue indicates non COMMO personnel
 (Circles indicate single elements)
 (Squares indicate team elements)
 (6x, 8x, 16x indicates recruitment in progress)
 (For KIBITZ 15, see Map C, MGKA-24379, para 15)

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Map A

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KIBITZ 1

One of our first recruits whose low qualifying code aptitude score did not justify his being sent through our strained training facilities is being held for his potential in some such supporting role as cutout, courier, or informant, depending on his economic, political or social position at the moment of activation. In this regard we tried to guide him into positions which would serve our purpose as well as his, but found that his lack of aggressiveness, which has been for him an asset of unobtrusiveness, is also a liability at the present when we have little time to develop people but must depend upon their own initiative. On the other hand we see no reason to drop him completely, for inasmuch as he would in any event act as only an accessory to other operational personnel, we can well leave him on his standby basis until we have the proper slot for him, at which time he can always be picked up again and be reviewed in terms of his then current value.

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KIBITZ 2

a. It is most difficult to predict the future of this case. While it at one time was our most (and only) promising feature of the KIBITZ program, it is now overshadowed by newer developments in other areas of recruitment. However, he still remains the most solid and trusted single element in the whole show. Unfortunately the CARINA [] altered his standing to an as yet undetermined degree and we have had to adjust our thinking accordingly. As far as we know, including mail and telephone intercept, [] has made no further effort to contact KIBITZ 2's family. And while the obvious incentive of the sister has long since been removed for having spent a considerable period of the intervening time with the mother in Switzerland, where she is ~~expected~~ to marry, if [] was not satisfied with BOB's "investigation" of whom [] might have been, [] could certainly have been expected to continue contact with 2 to find out more of what it was all about.

b. However, be that as it may, we have adjusted our sights on 2 and lowered him to a minor role. In the first steps we had disassociated him from 5 and 6. The 5 separation now being most complete since when they moved to a new neighborhood, and both wives since having had new babies, their social visiting came to a complete stop. While 2 was never fully aware of our proximity to 5, the apparent disassociation was further enhanced by casual inquiries of 2 regarding 5's well being and even taking the 5 baby gift to 2 for delivery with the excuse that we just never seem to get time to visit any of the other old friends on our few occasions in Esslingen. On the other hand we use a slight friction between the two wives to implore the 5's never to tell the 2's of our visits with the statement, "You know how jealous she is".

c. As for the 2 - 6 link, as previously stated, they are operationally separated. However, we have learned that there is sometimes more risk in our direct contacts with 6 than through 2 as a cutout. So, in emergencies we still occasionally require 2 to contact 6 for us to arrange meetings. This is done without any explanation to 2 regarding the purpose of the meetings nor are reports in progress made. They each know they are not to learn of details of the other.

d. KIBITZ 2 then stands alone with his 4 and though he has turned up other prospects we have discouraged any expansion without explanation, though we are prepared to tell him, and have even inferred that we do not plan further development in that area but must spread out to other parts of Germany. He of course knows the part he is to play in the stay-behind plans, and should be given Commo training if only up to the basic proficiencies. Then, as later circumstances

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dictate, he can be given further training or held in reserve, but he will have had the fundamentals to preface development to his best abilities. As will be discussed under KIBITZ 16, we have formulated an ideal team under a competent chief where 2 could perform as alternate funkier or courier-cutout. In this respect, we are also asking to include 2's wife in the basic training course. Training her for a reserve position does not increase the risk to date but will increase the potential of their element should 2 be drafted into a military or labor unit. She, having seen service in a German Air Force search light battery has a fairly realistic view of what war can be like and would be prepared to accept the pari-military discipline of a stay-behind assignment. Finally, it would be our start (and test) of training women as Commo agents. We repeat, for her as well as him: their training is to be in minimum security basic commo, and would or could be picked up by 16 (who knows them both, but they do not know we are associated with him) would he need or care to use them.

e. VULTURE /B/C or /D could be made available to KIBITZ 2.

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KIBITZ 3

a. For a long time we had cause to wonder how we would make out with this young fellow. Developed for his qualification of a handicapping paralysis, we at first had no facilities to train him. Later when facilities became available he had become engaged in full employment (Stuttgart Verkehrs Verein) which precluded any extended sessions at MISSOURI as required for beginners. Presented with this almost hopeless situation we did not divulge our real interest in the fellow, and though his finding employment obviated our cover of assessing him for a job with Signal Corps, we continued cultivating him (and his family) on a personal basis while waiting for something to break. However, their response to our interest became embarrassing and actually a burden on them as at least one member of the family was kept on the alert at the window for our visits, and any black Ford in the vicinity was a signal for feverish activity of straightening up the house, spreading a table, and running for wine. At the same time the difference in our ages and lack of common interest caused our relations to become quite pointless. I therefore found "my work in Heidelberg" so pressing that future visiting could be temporarily deferred. However, we had in the meantime switched him from possible employment with the Signal Corps to amateur radio as a hobby for the physically handicapped and he was prepared to receive directions and help toward preparing for this fascinating pastime which might still be useful for work with the Americans at some later date.

b. Therefore, as KIBITZ 14 was recruited we had in mind the need for someone to start #3 in training to get him up to a proficiency where a short session at MISSOURI would suffice. When #14 needed a cover for his time consuming meetings with [] he was told as though it were an honest fact that benevolent American [] had a young paralytic friend who needed a hobby and that [] was willing to help him get started by paying #14 for training him in Morse, helping him build his set, etc. We thus started #3's training under this cover. However, #3, with his psychological handicap which so often accompanies the physical, felt he was an imposition on the obviously busy #14. So, as an alternate we furnished #3 with an instructograph to continue his training alone. [], who is continuing the visits, reports that #3 is making enthusiastic progress. However, living in cramped quarters with the rest of the family has caused #3's training to be a family affair with the one brother participating in the "fun", and the whole family enthusiastically sure that "Mr. Nicholas" will be proud of the boy's achievement.

c. Thus we find ourselves a little wide of our original mark, but will apply controls as possible, such as first hindering #3 from applying for an amateur radio operator's license on the grounds that it had just occurred to us that as a radio amateur he would be booked and catalogued and probably someday be interned should the Communists take over. Therefore he must cease home activity, but if he proves to us that he can keep a secret, we will arrange for him to visit other friends of ours ([] or []) who will let him go

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on the air with their clandestine sets. Finally, we are sure that when the time comes for him to step into his clandestine role he will do so without the slightest hesitation.

d. VULTURES B/C/D/ or E could be made available to KIBITZ 3.

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KIBITZ 4

Originally recruited for Commo training, we are doing nothing to further develop this man. We have enough difficulties training more desirable Commo men from scratch, and since we have no training facilities for improving on his military experience, which already points him as a military observer and courier-cutout, we feel that further personal contact would be an unwarranted risk. Rather, we will for the time being accept him as he is: KIBITZ 2's selection of a most trustworthy person who can be counted on to do his best under any circumstances be it with #2 or #16.

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KIBITZ 5

a. KIBITZ 5 is a man of considerable communications experience, competent as both radio operator and technician. There is no change in his status, as previously reported nor has he been briefed as to his specific duties, as we feel prematurity is an unnecessary risk. When on occasion he asks, he is told not to worry; one such as he will at the right time be told or find out the right thing to do. As for our present plans, we foresee him as a completely equipped lone communications agent who could at any time be directed to or be picked up by an intelligence agent. Granted that his present employment with the Americans is a deterrent to his stayability, it is one of the compromises we have to make in order to get personnel of Commo experience who are readily convertible to our needs. In this case, as in any other, we will have to hope on false documentation to offset such liabilities.

b. VULTURES B/C/D or E could be made convertible to KIBITZ 5.

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KIBITZ 6

a. A test (our first) of training communications personnel from scratch. We are only too aware of his disqualifying factors such as his presidency of the student union, etc. However, it is one of the prices we must sometimes pay in order to get men with enough courage to do the job they are supposed to do. In a country such as Germany, wrought with turmoil and strife through each succeeding generation, we are finding that Germans almost to a man have had more than one opportunity to commit what the Russians might easily consider a crime against a people's democracy, and if they had the courage of conviction which we now need, they are already "guilty" in some manner or other. On the other hand, his mother's social connections in England are innocent enough, as are her connections with France, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc., any and all countries whose students have studied in Tuebingen and boarded at her home. We feel that she could be only slightly more suspect than any other pension hostess. On the credit side is her pro-Western orientation which prompts her to encourage her last of four sons to give what he can to the cause. As a matter of fact we almost wish we had trained the old lady instead of the son!

b. KIBITZ 6 has had two courses in Commo training, basic and intermediate, taken during his precious school vacations in two sessions at MISSOURI which have left Condon a very much-used instructor. He is yet to have the advanced course on operational type signal plans whenever Commo is prepared to give them.

c. As for operational objective, we foresee him as the communications link to his area of the French Zone for whatever may occur, his own intelligence and guidance tentatively considered to come from his own selected #6x who, as a major on a Corps staff can be presumed qualified to guide this operation. Further efforts to conclude the 6x recruitment are considered premature until we are prepared to offer training in our style of reporting, operational plans, ciphering etc., to better his present potential. This we consider as reasonable in that premature conclusion of recruitment (i.e. contact with []) is an unwarranted risk as well as the fact that previous experience has shown that men of his reported type (attorney) want to see facts and plans. However, we are asking for approval of plans for a field problem in which #6 will recover transmitter, setup and go on the air. (See KIBITZ 10).

d. KIBITZ 6 is, as previously reported, operationally divorced from #2, and neither knows of the other's progress or status. However, we have found it more secure to use #2 as cutout in some cases such as if we require a meeting with #6 in an urgency which could not wait for mail service, (which we do not like to use anyway) and therefore require use of telephone which is not in #6's apartment and therefore risks our American accent being detected by other residents of the house. We can ask #2 to place the necessary cryptic call,

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which at least guarantees we will not encounter #6's apartment full of fellow students. (The mother's alertness once saved us from one such disastrous incident.)

e. VULTURE J could be made available to #6.

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KIBITZ 7

a. This University of Heidelberg law student remains without change although we had hoped to be able to report him in training at this writing. However, as we were unable to coordinate his part-time MISSOURI training while the school was still in the vicinity of Heidelberg, he now justly enough is resisting our pressure to get him to make the long trips to and from MISSOURI's new secure but isolated location. The first of his sessions for five days of his present eight day vacation was scheduled for 6 November upon his return from a three day visit with his parents. However, he had not yet returned to Heidelberg at our last check on 8 November and though his landlady insisted that it could only be illness of his mother which could delay his return for even another day, we called this session off. The impracticality of making another trip to check on his return so that he could be sent on such a long trip for the remaining short time could have only aggravated the situation. We will wait until his next vacation over the holidays, and try to work things out the best we can until some flexibility or mobility for training can be arranged to accommodate these fully occupied candidates who have to get their training on a part-time basis.

b. The operational employment of KIBITZ 7 will depend upon then current conditions. Until such time as we need give less concern to the communications training phases and can concentrate on the development of agent personnel, #7 is to be considered as a lone Commo agent in preparation to take his place on any intelligence team formed in the Heidelberg area.

c. VULTURE F could be made available to KIBITZ 7.

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KIBITZ 8

This agent having had no previous Commo experience, is not considered for Commo training, but is to act as recruiter and possibly leader of a stay-behind unit. He has proceeded with such caution that we had about given up on him. However, with no prodding from us his final production of two subagents, one of Commo experience, is indicative of the deep-seated determination to do the job. Negotiations for [] to conclude the recruitment of the two agents are now in progress.

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KIBITZ 9

a. Having had no previous communications experience upon which we could build to develop him as a Commo agent, he has been assigned as recruiter and cutout, 9a (now in training) being his first production. Further, he knows he is to use his communications facilities to report intelligence available to him or to act as link between his Commo agent and any other agent activity as designated for his area.

b. The only significant change in this case is the long hoped for change of employment from the Amerika Haus work to civilian employment. He is now working for the Süddeutsche Zündholz AG, Augsburg. He already completed his probationary employment as production engineer and, as the only obvious replacement for the present over-age staff he stands good prospects of rapid advancement.

c. VULTURE H could be made available to KIBITZ 9.

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KIBITZ 9a

a. A former Wehrmacht funkler who should require only a quickie course at MISSOURI to bring him up to basic proficiency, he is still a training problem to us. Since we missed utilizing his period of unemployment for training, he now thinks we are being a little unreasonable if we try to insist on his travelling eight hours round trip from Saturday noon till Sunday evening to get a few hours in at MISSOURI when he would (or should) rather spend his weekends alternately with his parents and his wife and new baby, or have a good reason why not. However, we did manage to get in some training on the weekend of 28-29 October. He then missed his scheduled meeting for 4-5 November but is spending the weekend of 18-19 November at MISSOURI.

b. He understands that his duties as a Commo agent will be to operate a clandestine radio, probably under the direction of #9, and thus serve as the communications link for intelligence activities, or even, and in a language he better understands, as liaison to resistance groups working behind the Communist aggressor forces lines.

c. VULTURE H could be made available to KIBITZ 9a.

Kibitz 9a

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KIBITZ 10 - 10a

a. Our Bavarian friend, LEDERHOSEN and all, a converted H'Dienst man, has had two sessions at MISSOURI and requires only the advanced course with operational type signal plans and ciphering when even Commo is authorized to provide such training. As further training for him we are asking for permission to mount a field problem in which KIBITZ 10 will be required to recover a set and actually get off a signal. We feel that such an exercise will be of immeasurable value to the agent and of obvious value to us.

b. Operationally, KIBITZ 10 has a fair knowledge of what will be expected of him and that his duties will be as Commo agent to submit military intelligence information as he is qualified from his military experience to collect and evaluate himself, or to serve as a link to other agents. He has chosen his long time friend, 10a, to assist him and provide protection to his activities. Also, at our request #10 has in full security approached and approved of the subject of MGKA-21834, a life long resident and innkeeper in this upper Bavarian village who can be counted on to provide safe haven to anyone who came in the name of #10.

c. As for #10's past military service as it might influence his stayability, we have spoken to him about it and are working now toward a documentation for him and his family so that he could assume a new identity as auto mechanic, which work he could do very well.

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KIBITZ 11

a. Though of no communications experience, and with little likelihood of training him, KIBITZ 11 was recruited on the basis of his anti-Communist ideals, further qualified through war injuries, for the purpose of building up a stay-behind team in the northern (Kassel) Amazon. To date he has recruited one team member, 11a, but has been hindered from further development due to forced change of employment caused by the business failure of his former employers and he is now employed at HERDECKE in the British Zone. This has caused a dislocation in the #11 - #11a unit. However, he still maintains his family at his old address and we therefore do not consider it a permanent dislocation.

b. VULTURE K could be made available to KIBITZ 11.

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KIBITZ 11a

a. Since his leader, 11, has temporarily moved out of our contact, we have in the meantime established direct contact with 11a, (from information obtained from him and Berlin Document Center - not considered same as Subject of MKK-W-5227) and proceeded with developing his potential as a support for any stay-behind activity in the Kassel area. Inasmuch as neither 11 or 11a is to be trained in Commo, 11a was directed to attempt a cultivation of the few amateur radio operators, one a physician, listed as in a nearby community. Further, we explored his primary asset of being a hunter with hunting rights that give him intimate knowledge of and access to the rural area near his home. From previous discussions he came prepared with a map showing his selection of a drop zone 800 m by 400 m on a plateau of a thickly wooded hill some 3 km from the nearest village. We inspected the area at night and from what we could see, it offered ideal security for drop operations and could even be used as an emergency light plane landing field. Our next step would be to aerial photo strip the area with coordinated bearings (it is an estimated 34 km southwest from the Fritzlar air base), prepare caches, and if possible dugouts or at least places to hide drop chutes and material until safer disposition could be made. However, any ground work will have to wait until we have personnel to do such jobs, and certainly until spring, as our one trip up there found the road almost impassable and we knocked a hole in our gas tank trying to negotiate the isolated trail.. So, as a temporary measure, we later cached the VULTURE set in a nearby but more accessible village. (See KIBITZ 12 for further discussion on development of drop zones).

b. VULTURE K could be made available to KIBITZ 11a.

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KIBITZ 12

a. []'s old one-legged hunting guide is not being considered for Commo training but fulfills a stay-behind operational need by the very nature of his existence as a small farmer with a large leased hunting area. The value of pre-locating such areas is assumed on the premise that we shall be required to make aerial drops of equipment, and such drops would have a percentage of success in direct proportion to our preparations for these drops. By preparation we mean going beyond the primary goal of recruiting someone with such areas under whose control we could survey the terrain. Rather, we view today's accomplishment as little more than an opportunity to go in and pre-develop these areas.

b. First, as part of the survey and for future accurate reference, these areas should be aerial photo-stripped from readily identifiable land marks. Secondly, ground surveys should be made to test avenues of deployment after landing, avenues of apprehension, etc. As we found in the 11a survey, some roads are practically impassable at some times of the year and would have proved disastrous if, for example, it had been planned to travel such roads toward an aerial evacuation. Thirdly, ground developments such as underground bunkers camouflaged to appear as root cellars wherein dropped personnel could take immediate cover to administer first aid, dispose of parachutes, etc., or where dropped material could immediately be disposed of. These elements we take to be essential in defense against alert police who might be attracted by the sounds of a plane making a drop (circling, changes of propellor pitch, the straight run for the drop, gunning of engines after the drop), in which case it would require a pitched battle by a partisan group (which we do not have) in order to defend the drop.

c. We admitted that such a preparation might appear disrelated to recruiting stay-behind agents, and, we are not about to personally undertake such excavation projects. However, it is presented as more than a think piece. It is in our view a necessity to guarantee the success of resupply or replacement of personnel in any stay-behind plans. Such a development will take maximum advantage of the facilities #12 offers. We therefore hope some day for enough personnel to arrange a hunting party billeted at various inns in the vicinity to converge on #12's and 11a's hunting preserve for "wild boar drives" under cover of which such developments can be accomplished.

d. As for #12 himself, though he looks older than his 56 years, one is not to underestimate his agility. The amputation of the left leg at the thigh sometimes seems only an excuse to carry fence vaulting poles made to look like crutches. He is known to be able to keep pace with his wirehaired dachshund on the trail of fox through snow that blocked our car on a secondary road and about exhausted [] and [] just breaking trail the mile or so to his house. Somehow he tagged the word "partisan" to [] definition of our

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stay-behind project. Called by whatever name he understands, he himself is not slated for an operational activity other than cover or permission to use and develop his land for cover. Nor do we anticipate using any such isolated areas as permanent radio transmission bases, as they would be too easily traced. Of course, VHF beam could advantageously be run from either the #11a or #12 zone elevations.

e. We do not know of nor see danger in his aged wife's knowing of his participation, and once developmental work is done on the farm, she would be equally guilty and moved to guard the security. Also, we see nothing to be gained in contacting the brother in the U.S., as suggested in MCK-W-6673. Incidentally, the brother paid a visit to the old farm this last summer.

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KIBITZ 13

The previous memos fully cover the development of this former Wehrmacht H'Dienst man who offered his service to the American intercept service and who has since been converted to KIBITZ. Really, he converted himself to KIBITZ when he became alarmed at the sudden collapse of Korea. And, when he proposed that the European Defense Forces set up a stay-behind network for the event of a Korean Parallel in Germany, we handled him in the same security as we do all volunteers. That is, we pretended ignorance of such matters, let him sell us on the feasibility of such a project, and then turned him loose to see what he could do. Inasmuch as security forbade us to give him the benefit of advice from our experience, he had to learn the hard way, and when after a few weeks of it we again called on him, we found him spinning his wheels in despair. The experience of enthusiastically presupposing standards of qualification for stay-behind agents, and then trying to find them is like a downhill ski runner hitting wet snow. Thus we found #13 floundering in the face of the discouraging fact that such people are almost non-existent. However, a critique of his work allowed us to think with him and guide him to concentrating on amateur radio operators, starting in Munich. Concentrating on a group of known positive qualifications, he did better; though he unearthed no particular prospects, he felt encouraged. However, his approach was faulty and he was almost sucked into joining a Ham club where, if he made a mistake in recruitments, his person and all his work would be blown or he would be wide open for penetration. A review of this showed his error and led to the more specific area of developing crippled Hams. For this we developed a cover for him as a free lance writer (under false documentation) who is collecting material for a human interest story on Amateur Radio as a pastime for the Physically Handicapped. With this cover he can go directly to any prominent member of the various Ham club chapters and get direct leads to this specially attractive group. Once such contacts are made, they can be developed to our purposes. However, we are not of the nature to bank too heavily on any one such effort. In order to guarantee some results from #13, he is presently being run through MISSOURI to prepare him as an operator in his own right. He has had considerable communications experience, is intelligent, and located in a priority area where we are presently without communication coverage.

Kibitz 13

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KIBITZ 14

a. Recruited for his technical knowledge of radio, and a leader among amateur radio operators, we had hoped to find his greatest help in bird dogging other amateurs. Help through such a bird dog would normally come by arranging contacts through innocent appearing social activities. However, he is so swamped with work that he has little time for anything else. He has so far offered one recommendation of an amputee radio ham, but rightly enough, does not want to expose himself by making a direct introduction. As yet we have had no occasion to make contact on our own.

b. VULTURE B/C/D/ or E could be made available to KIBITZ 14.

Kibitz 14

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KIBITZ 15

a. The suddenness of the crisis in Korea did not only scare KIBITZ 13, it also startled us into thinking that though we too do not believe a general outbreak in hostilities imminent, we take small relief in that our beliefs have not yet been shattered as were probably the beliefs of our counterparts in Korea. However, had such been the case, and we had of necessity evacuated, we would have left a partly finished job with no hope of continuing the work from the outside, nor do we have anyone capable or within our trust with knowledge to be left behind to finish the job. It was in the depth of this despairing thought that KIBITZ 15 appeared with his request to be allowed to do something. And as detailed in previous memos, after sufficient security palavering, we told him of the Defense Forces' need for a stay-behind net. He was offered, and accepted the assignment on a trial basis to see if such a net could be organized and we have worked as closely with him as time would permit. Again we could not present ourselves as a person of any knowledge in the matter but had to permit him to feel that the initiative was all his with only critiques from us through which we guided his activity.

b. This, his first progress report, represents his person to person survey of all likely candidates with whom he had a heart to heart talk regarding their attitudes to the Communist invasion threat. On the basis of these conversations, he divided the candidates into two categories; those who are wholeheartedly and without reservation willing to commit themselves to stay-behind activities for the purpose of gathering and submitting tactical intelligence and act as, or link to, sabotage actives. In the other category, and as evidence of his selectivity, he places those who are now holding out for the western governments to quit their "foolishness" and accept the Germans on their merits as a people who have long recognized and fought the threat of Communism but who are still being viewed as a second class group of people.

c. As the attached map C indicates, KIBITZ 15 has, from his number one group, an organization of 18 agents with 9 communication stations, set up parallel to ours with no lines crossing in any manner. Some of the names have already been checked and we are proceeding with the checking of the others to be sure we are not bumping into any other stay-behind operations. However, we have queried him on each and every man and saw no signs in the responses from them which would indicate their having other tie-ins.

d. Now, though he projects his further activity to cover certain other areas of Germany of strategic importance such as yet uncovered transportation centers and invasion routes, we are asking him to limit further recruiting to only top-notch prospects, to round out his present units and, centered around communications personnel on hand, progressively set up four communications centers. The first step of this is, of course, complete PRQ's on the Commo men to be trained. We hope that by the time the first man is through basic training we will have further word on plans and ciphers so that he as well as we will be able to field operationally readied teams. Thus we would have contact with both shows, come what may.

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
KIBITZ 16

a. One of our longest drawn out recruiting jobs, and probably one of our best. As covered in previous memo, #16 is capable of running a worthwhile stay-behind information net. However, his present desire is to work alone with his brother-in-law, a former funkier, as his communications link. And, his part as court appointed defense counsel for three local Communist youth up for trial for activities against the interest of the occupation powers could be considered as a clue to his potential as an agent in good standing with the KPD. However, his proven character and leadership suggest that he can be counted too to chew off a bigger chunk, and for this we wish to prepare other elements for him. We have in mind #2 (and #4) who is in #16's sporting club (#2 does not know of our association with #16), and also #5. With these auxiliaries we could set up a pretty good show in which we would have all the trimming: i.e. #16 as Chief, #16x only receiving (sending on extreme emergency), #2 and/or his wife) and #5, not in contact with each other, alternating in the transmission.

b. VULTURE B/C/D/ or E could be made available to KIBITZ 16.

Kibitz 16

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KIBITZ \$15 Staybehind Development
 Legend: Red circles indicate Commo personnel
 Blue circles indicate non Commo personnel

1 Nov 1950

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map

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KIBITZ 17

a. Our newest recruit, also a student at the University of Heidelberg, is the son of a successful manufacturer near Mannheim. KIBITZ 17, a former Wehrmacht intercept man under [] had been making bull session talk regarding his concern for the threatening Communist activity about which something should be done, which sounded to [] as though he was ready for recruitment. While [] has no exact details of our activity, he knows we are on the alert for likely persons and occasionally points them out to us. Of these, most are wide enough of our target to indicate [] is not knowing too much, but #17 was a bullseye.

b. As security, we did not tell #17 of what we are doing, but rather asked for his history on which we might be able to formulate an activity for him. He is, of course, a trained Commo man, but beyond that, we see his father's firm which could provide cover employment. Also we are thinking of 17's University contacts which reach to all parts of Germany.

c. VULTURE F could be made available to KIBITZ 17.

Kibitz 17

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As we recruit and develop KIBITZ personnel we are ever conscious of the factors of stayability, and where compromises must be made in order to staff men who can be practicably turned out as finished Commo agents we will have to rely on documentation to enhance stayability. This is specifically true of KIBITZ 5, 8x, 9a, 10, 13, 14, 16x and 17, and in a sense, all others in that they too should have documentation which would assist their escape should they find the heat on them. We have therefore initiated the program of preparing documents for all KIBITZ agents, and the fact that TAD's personnel and logistic problems is causing delays of up to six months in getting some of these documents out is, at the moment, not too disturbing. We are sure that when the entire problem of documenting 20, 30, or 50 such people is appreciated, the required personnel can be made available to the project. However, new identities will require more than just documentation to make them stick. In a controlled state, such as Germany is today, and even more stringent in any national crisis, every citizen must be registered and cleared by the police. Every ration and living accommodation request must be substantiated by the police clearance. In most cases, police clearance is obtained from the police of the previous declared residence, which means that anyone expecting to live long under false identity will have had to initiate that identity with an original police clearance from some place and build it up through successive moves to the date of actual need for that identity. Even transients, going from one hotel to another cannot expect to escape for long, because, when the copy of the hotel desk register is sent to the police of declared permanent residence only to be returned with the report that no such person is registered as living there, the new identity is immediately placed on the wanted list and the search is on. Thus every control, including highway and railroad travel, will have to be backed up with a cleared police registration from some originating point through a series of successive moves to the current date.

This, as far as we can ascertain, is best accomplished by cultivating the burgermeister of some place who will trustfully register one as a resident, from where one builds up the identity by moves through other city police channels away from the only possible leak in the security of the process. It is assumed that a minimum of three moves would be sufficient as traces would not likely go back further than that except in extreme cases. But when one thinks of coordinating three such moves for every one of our agents, whether they are to use the identity operationally or as get-away identities, one sees that we have a job cut out for us. Further, we visualize but few of our agents as being mobile enough to take time for each one to cultivate his own burgermeister with a story such as being an East Zone refugee who bought his Kennkarte black and now needs legitimation. We confess that we do not know the answer, but are starting with ~~C~~ own new identity to see how he makes out and if he is successful, we will go further with the operation. It might be that we will find it necessary to assign a trusted German who would be capable of assuming the necessary identities and, on a full time basis, work the thing through.

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VULTURE Program

We are also at this time including a summary on the program of caching VULTURE equipment. Though detailed reports of these burials will be found in other memos, we present this VULTURE summary as part of the KIBITZ report in order that the two related projects can be viewed in like perspective.

X
VULTURE A: Transported piecemeal to Leipzig by [] , it was left in the safe keeping of a wartime buddy, THOMAS, who was instructed to make an interim burial which he did on the site of a ruined hospital. We found it operationally impossible to rebury the set, and since the equipment is now some two years underground, it can be considered deteriorated beyond use and is therefore scratched.

VULTURE B: Buried by [] and [] in February 1949 in an area approximately 6 km north of Esslingen/N (near Stuttgart).

This set could be available to KIBITZ 2, 3, 5, 14 and 16.

VULTURE C: Buried by [] and [] in April of 1949 in Esslingen/N near Stuttgart.

VULTURE C could be available to KIBITZ 2, 3, 5, 14 or 16.

VULTURE D: Buried by [] and [] in April, 1949, in Wuerttemberg/Baden at a point south of the Stuttgart-Munich autobahn where it passes Denkendorf/Stuttgart.

VULTURE D could be made available to KIBITZ 2 who is acquainted with the area.

VULTURE E: Buried in June 1950 by [] and [] in Wuerttemberg/Baden near Stuttgart, Germany.

VULTURE E could be made available to KIBITZ 2, 3, 5, 14 or 16.


VULTURE F: Buried in June, 1950 by [] and [] in Wuerttemberg/Baden between Heidelberg and Bruchsal, Germany.

VULTURE F could be made available to KIBITZ 7 or 17.

VULTURE G: Buried in July 1950 by [] and [] in Hesse near Frankfurt, Germany.

VULTURE H: Buried in August 1950 by [] and [] at the Bavarian border of Wuerttemberg/Baden near Ulm, Germany.

VULTURE H could be made available to KIBITZ 9a.



VULTURE BURIAL COVERAGE AS OF 10 NOVEMBER 1950

Map B
top B

VULTURE I: Buried in September 1950 by [] and []
[] in Wuerttemberg/Baden, Germany at the Frankfurt-
Munich-Ettlingen autobahn junction, located approximately
3 kilometers southeast of Karlsruhe.

VULTURE J: Buried in October 1950 by [] and []
[] in Wuerttemberg/Baden, Germany,
(approximately 25 meters from the French Zone of occupation),
between Waldenbuch, Kreis Boblingen and Dettenhausen, Kreis
Tuebingen.

VULTURE J could be made available to KIBITZ 6.

VULTURE K: Buried in October 1950 by [] [] and []
and [] in Hesse, Germany, between
Ziegenhain and Homberg am Elze.

VULTURE K could be made available to KIBITZ 11 and 11a.

VULTURE L: Buried in October 1950 by [] [] and []
and [] in Bavaria, Germany, between
Ansbach and Schwabische Hall.

VULTURE M: Buried in November 1950 by [] and []
in Bavaria, Germany between Munich and Landsberg.

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